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Abstract—Phishing is one of the most common attacks in the
world, especially with the increasing usage of mobile platforms
and e-commerce. Although many users are weary of phishing
attacks from suspicious paths in the URL address, phishing still
accounts for a large proportion of all of malicious attacks as
it is easy to deploy. Most browser vendors mainly adopt two
approaches against phishing; the blacklist and the heuristic-
based. However, both have related limitations.
In this paper, a novel method was proposed to protect against
phishing attacks. By using image recognition (OCR) technology,
phishing attacks can be distinguished from the actual website
by reading the logos on the website and comparing with the
site URL. An easy to implement prototype demonstrated a high
accuracy of detection in the experimental trials.
Index Terms—Phishing, OCR, Phishing Prevention
I. INTRODUCTION
The internet has become an indispensable element in our
daily life; it provides significant resources to people whether
for play, work or education. Moreover, with the increased
universality of mobile devices, a magnitude of services is at
our fingertips, including financial transactions. As shown by
existing data from the British Bankers Association and Ernst
& Young (EY) in 2017 [1], consumers are increasingly shifting
to managing their assets by using mobile banking apps, and
this number has continually increased over the past year, as
shown in Figure 1.
Meanwhile, users still face a large challenge, which is mo-
bile security. Both Apple and Google have different strategies
to protect the security of devices and apps [2], but phishing
is still hard to prevent. In a survey shown from McAfee in
2015, approximate 97% of consumers were unable to identify
phishing emails correctly [3]. Moreover, with the increase in
usage of QR codes, QR phishing presents a threat to this new
and convenient technology [4]. Today, the majority of users
are wise to phishing attacks from suspicious paths in the URL
address. But different to laptop or PC, mobile systems and
browsers often lack secure identification, so the user cannot
easily identify the phishing URLs from the target address
[2]. For phishing emails and QR phishing, the malicious
URL are often made invisible, and most unwary users do not
check the accessed address [5]. As a survey from Wandera
shows, a new phishing site is created every 20 seconds [6].
Problematically, list-based phishing protection services are not
Fig. 1. Mobile Banking Users at Major UK Banks [1]
effective to isolate these suspicious sites because sites are
not detected and registered in real-time [6]. According to the
Kaspersky Lab anti-phishing investigation, over 246 million
user attempts to access different kinds of phishing pages have
been detected, with 54% being attempts to access a financial-
related website versus 47% in 2016. This is the first time
that financial phishing accounts for over 50% of all phishing
attacks [7]. Therefore, with this increasing trend, phishing
defences whether in mobile platforms or PC platforms needs
to be better and faster. In this paper, we present a novel method
to protect against phishing attacks and also demonstrate a high
accuracy rate through several evaluation experiments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in
section 2, we review the related work. In section 3 we describe
the methodology used and subsequently, the experimental
results are evaluated and related limitations are analyzed in
section 4. Lastly, section 5 summarizes this work and includes
our conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
We focused on three aspects in the literature reviewed:
phishing, phishing prevention & detection and security strate-
gies on mobile platforms.
In Felt and Wagner [2], the risk of phishing on mobile
platforms was assessed. The concept of control transfer was
introduced, which is that web sites in mobile browsers should
obey the standard Same Origin Policy 1 as they are potentially
untrustworthy, which indicates that web sites on different
domains should be isolated from each other. However, neither
Android nor Apple restrict access to mobile web sites. Thus
phishing always occurs during a control transfer, such as a
trusted inter-application link which may point to a malicious
target instead.
In Krombholz et al. [8], the emerging technology of QR
codes was shown to be a phishing attack vector as they are
cheap to produce and easy to deploy. Either the attacker
replaces the entire QR code or the attacker modifies a few
pixels of a QR code to be used as the attack vector. These
encoded malicious QR codes redirect the user to a phishing
scam. As shown by existing data from Sharma [9], the first
malicious case using QR codes was detected in September
2011.
The battle against phishing has been continuing and the rel-
evant current prevention and detection strategies are presented
next. Generally, most browser vendors adopt two approaches
against phishing: blacklist and heuristic-based [10]. In the first
method, the target URL will be checked from the phishing
blacklist before accessing the URL, but this static method
cannot prevent phishing completely. This is because all of the
phishing URLs in the blacklist need people to report them,
and there is no way to improve this blacklist dynamically, so
newly created phishing websites will not exist in this pool.
In the second method, phishing can be detected through the
characteristics of the target, such as the content of the web
site [11]. Some machine learning approaches are derived from
this method.
Most machine learning methods use lexical and host-based
analysis to categorize the features. For example, in some
research [8] [12] [13], the textual properties in the URL are
considered for lexical analysis. For host-based analysis, the
server properties are investigated from WHOIS2, such as IP
address, registration information etc. However, gathering this
information may become a hard problem due to possible
restrictions in the future. WHOIS has continually sparked
controversy as it generates too much private information. The
BBC in May 2018 stated that most of this information have
been wiped from WHOIS in order to comply with the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation [14].
In addition, research into security indicators of phishing
on the browser is relatively mature. In the investigation by
Egekman. S, Cranor. L and Hong. J [15], an active warning
was more effective than a passive warning, as the user often
ignores the pop-up message.
1Same Origin Policy: An import concept in web security. Under this policy,
scripts can only access data from sites which are the same as the origin page.
An origin is defined as a combination of URL scheme, host name and port
number [21]. This means it ensure that the script running on a site can only
access data from the origin website itself.
2WHOIS: Finds information on any domain name or website. https://who.is/
However, phishing prevention on mobile platforms is more
complicated than expected. Besides the same problems as
the desktop computer, it still faces two additional challenges.
Firstly, the majority of phishing links come from phishing
emails, and mobile platforms do not support secure identi-
fication [2]. The mobile user is unable to know whether the
accessed URL address is safe, especially if the user lacks secu-
rity awareness. For example, Google Chrome provides much
better security against phishing than other web browsers [10].
It shows a warning page if the accessed URL is malicious,
but the Chrome browser does not provide this service on the
mobile platform, as shown in Figure 2. In addition, the user
may still fall victim to a scam even if they check the URL. For
example, some phishing scams exploit JavaScripts scrollTo()
function to hide the original URL bar on the page, which
is replaced by a fake address bar within the page [16]. This
is below the real address bar to confuse the user. Although
this risk has already been fixed recently, it still exists in older
versions of the platform.
Fig. 2. Chrome access same website PayPal by using PC and mobile [10]
Secondly, there are phishing risks from QR (Quick Re-
sponse) codes on mobile platforms. A QR code is encoded,
so it is unreadable by humans and specific QR readers are
needed to parse the information. Thus it is possible to trigger
a potential vulnerability, such as buffer overflows or command
injection by reading the manipulated QR code [17] [18]. More-
over, 31 QR scanner applications were compared in [19], with
only two apps having a security warning feature, but they also
had a higher ratio of false negative errors. Subsequently, two
better open source APIs (Google safe browsing, phishtank)
were recommended to improve the phishing prevention accu-
racy (True Positive), but the static limitations (of blacklists)
has not yet been overcome.
Therefore, in this paper, we present a novel approach
to defend against phishing. By using OCR3 technology, a
dynamic detection method can be deployed using the image
content of the web. It not only solves the blacklist’s static
3OCR(Optical Character Recognition): The Vision API can detect and
extract text from images. https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/ocr
limitation issue, but also avoids the privacy restriction issues
from WHOIS by using related machine learning.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Research Aim
The aim of this research is to determine the purpose of the
website using the logo or the background image by applying
image recognition techniques. Then, by comparing these facets
to the official website, we identify potential phishing activity
from the accessed URL. The implementation is divided to four
steps, as shown below:
1) Extract the image
2) Describe the image content
3) Confirm the official URL
4) Verify the accessed URL
B. Preliminary Requirement
In order to verify the feasibility of the preliminary method-
ology, a python program was written to detect images and
search related official website. As part of the implementation,
some open source APIs need to be registered:
• Google Optical Character Recognition (OCR) API
• Google Search API
C. Procedures
The following steps were applied to 40 URLs taken from
PhishTank and analyzed as a proof of concept.
1) Extract the image: In order to confirm the purpose
of the website, the first step was to use a web crawler to
extract the related images. Generally, there are two methods to
link the logo or background image in most websites; HTML
code and .css files. In the first approach, the logo image is
usually inserted under the <img>tag in HTML code, such
as Google.com or Microsoft.com. In the second approach, the
logo image has been linked via .css file, under the attributes of
background or background-img, such as occurs in PayPal.com.
All of these conditions should be considered when we extract
the background image due to the complexity and diversity of
phishing.
2) Describe the image content: In this step, we use the
Google Optical Character Recognition (OCR) API to detect
image based content information. Because this API only works
for recognizing specific text in an image, the content of redun-
dant images, such as a symbol icon from the .css file, scenery
or character images from HTML <img>tags, will be ignored.
This increases the efficiency for subsequent manipulation. We
also tried other OCR APIs, such as Microsoft Azure, to exam
the extracted content. But the result was not as good as
expected, this will be mentioned in the next section.
3) Confirm the official URL: From the description of the
image content above, we can identify the expected purpose of
this website. In this step, the related official URL address will
be obtained by using a keyword search in the Google Search
API. According to these keywords, the related official URL
addresses can be confirmed, and we only kept the top three
results from the returned result list in our initial experiment.
Generally, the first URL may be the official URL of this
website; the second may be the Wiki link about this website;
and the third may be the related news about this website, or
other branches of this website. For example, in one of our
experiments, ”PayPal” text was recognized from a phishing
PayPal website, and the related official URLs were confirmed
by using a Google Search from this text, as shown in Figure
3.
Fig. 3. Search key words PayPal, and related result
4) Verify the accessed URL: As most websites have already
used SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) to improve the security of
the transmission due to its encrypted link, this ensures all data
are private and integral under an established channel between
a web server and a browser [20]. Therefore, we verify the
security of the accessed URL by comparing the SSL certificate
information.
First, we attempted to retrieve the SSL and associated hash
thumbprint to confirm the consistency between the accessed
URLs and the official URL. However, the result is not as good
as we expected. The hash value may be inconsistent under
different domain names or branches in the same company.
For example, as shown in Figure 4, the SSL certificate hash
value is different between https://www.google.com/ and https:
//www.google.co.uk/. So, finally, we used the organization
name in SSL certificates to confirm that these websites belong
to the same company, and verify the security of the accessed
URL against all registered URLs.
Fig. 4. SSL certificate hash comparison
IV. EVALUATION
A. Analysis and Result
In order to detect the accuracy of this approach, several
malicious URLs were detected from PhishTank, and all of
these URLs satisfy the following conditions:
• These URLs have to be online during the detection phase.
• Their logo must contain text, otherwise an API would not
return the description.
• Their logo must be in English, as the OCR API only
works in English in the prototype.
In the preliminary testing, we randomly collected 40 dif-
ferent phishing URLs from PhishTank. We found most of the
reported phishing URLs in this blacklist were about financial
accounting with 72.5% (29/40) sites being financial sites such
as PayPal, Alibaba, American Express, NatWest, etc., as shown
in Figure 5. In this 72.5%, the highest proportion was PayPal,
at 79% (23/29), as shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 5. 72.5% of 40 randomly chosen phishing URLs are about financial
accounting
Fig. 6. PayPal was the highest proportion of 40 financial accounting sites at
79%
Under our approach, 90% (36/40) phishing URLs were
successfully identified, and only 4 URLs were missed. We
analyzed these failures and the main reason was due to the
logo extraction phase. This means the purpose of the website
in Step 2 would be incorrect if the logo image was extracted
unclearly or incorrectly in Step 1. When we further analyzed
the results, the specific reasons were:
• The logo was presented in text rather than by image, so
it is quite hard to clearly identify this by web crawler.
• The whole page was presented in an image, so there was
too much detail for the OCR API to process.
B. Limitations and Challenges
Undoubtedly, OCR technology is the crucial part in this
method and the accuracy of the final result is subject to
recognized details. At first, we tried to use Microsoft (Azure)
OCR API in our approach. However, the testing result was
not as good as expected, because it would not work under
some special cases, such as a logo with a dark background
colour. Also it only supported the JPEG, PNG, GIF and BMP
image formats. Some websites have used SVG files as the
logo image format, thus, we switched to Google OCR API
in our implementation, which overcomes all the limitations of
the former approach.
The recognized result is also affected by the web crawler
because the recognized result is worthless if the extracted logo
image is incorrect. Therefore, according to all of these issues,
the limitations and challenges are concluded as:
• The accuracy of logo image extraction: In various
versions of phishing, a logo may be inserted by a different
method, it is therefore hard to locate a logo image if, for
example, the whole page is an image.
• The cost of OCR API: There are various APIs which can
be used to recognize the text from the image. However,
all of them are not free. There are a free quota per
day, around 1000 times, but any extra checks need to
be charged for. Thus if you want to process on a larger
level, the cost of OCR API should be considered.
• The efficiency of system: Phishing websites can be
varied and complex; a phishing URL may store a lot
of images, or .css files. If we have this situation, the
computing process may be much longer, either for the
web crawler, or the image recognition process (as all of
images need to be recognized).
• Single detectability: The threat of phishing is varied, it
can not only steal the victim’s private information, but
also execute a virus to infect the victims causing them
to become a component of a botnet. However, using this
method, it is not possible to prevent the risk from the
implanted virus in a phishing site.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Phishing attacks are always cheap to produce and easy to
deploy, and most vendors have been using different approaches
to prevent phishing. However, these solutions cannot keep
up with the constant updating of phishing websites. In this
paper, we reviewed related literature about phishing attacks
and preventions, and we presented a novel approach to iden-
tify phishing websites by using an OCR technique. Unlike
previous research, our approach overcomes the limitations of
current methods and research solutions, not only providing a
dynamic detection method, but also avoids privacy restriction
issues, such as WHOIS results in machine learning. Even if
the phishing server has been compromised, it can also be
identified. Although this technique has a few limitations to
be improved, it enables a high detection accuracy rate and the
evaluation results look promising.
We aim to implement this approach in mobile platforms.
On mobile platforms, more challenges would be faced, such
as:
• Frequent detection may affect the limited resources on
mobile platform, either in power or in network band-
width.
• Whether it is possible to use a minimal data or no network
data to detect phishing.
• How to insert this functionality in current browsers,
implement all manipulations on server side to reduce the
resource consumption on the mobile user side.
Therefore, we will attempt to overcome current limitations
and deploy a more suitable solution to these mobile security
challenges.
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